



Though facing complex challenges, America’s foreign policy
strategy must remain a continual work in progress.
America today faces a number of complex foreign policy challenges, with few obvious routes
towards their successful resolution. In light of this complexity, many may yearn for the clarity of the
Cold War, but Daniel J. Sargent warns against this. He writes that the Cold War policy of
containment was no roadmap for policy, and that within its relatively loose outlook policymakers
improvised and adapted, and pursued diverse agendas. In contemporary foreign policy,
strategists must also acknowledge the potential need to change quickly, and the validity of
alternative perspectives on the world.
In January, on Capitol Hill, a tedious slur on Henry Kissinger (“war criminal”) provoked an irate reaction (“low-life
scum”). The clash between Senator McCain and the protesters of Code Pink garnered media coverage and
YouTube clicks. The Senate’s hearings on national strategy not so much. This is unfortunate. For world-weary
superpowers, opportunities for sustained strategic reflection are rare. The transfer of power in the Senate affords
such an occasion, and John McCain has seized it. His committee hearings nonetheless illustrate both the many
challenges facing American foreign policy and the limits of strategy as a guide to foreign-policy choice.
Making strategy is intellectual work. The strategist seeks to explain the patterns of world events, hopeful that
comprehension will guide policy and permit policymakers to shape global trends. Requiring interpretation, making
strategy is akin to writing history, but what the strategist explains is the present and future. Henry Kissinger once
put it thus: “I think of myself as a historian… I have tried to understand the forces that are at work in this period.”
During the Cold War, the forces at work were clear — or so it now appears. The world was divided, and the United
States stood for freedom and against the Soviet Union. Washington did not push the USSR too hard, for doing so
risked war. Instead, policymakers adhered to a strategy of containment, the logic of which presumed that the
USSR would crumble upon its inner contradictions. History vindicated this theory, and many now yearn for the
coherence that containment presumably imparted to US foreign policy. The Cold War was dangerous, General
Brent Scowcroft told the McCain hearings, but at least “we knew what the strategy was.”
Americans should not yearn for such clarity. Containment nostalgia distorts the actual adaptability of US foreign
policy in the Cold War. The search for strategic coherence is, moreover, inappropriate to the needs of US foreign
policy today, which requires not intellectual cohesion but tolerance for complexity, improvisation, and even
contradiction.
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Consider Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski — two of the sages who addressed McCain’s committee. They
rank among America’s clearest strategic thinkers, but neither was in his own time a strategic dogmatist. Henry
Kissinger began as an adept practitioner of Cold War geopolitics, but as new challenges mounted, he pirouetted to
champion cooperation on issues, like energy, that had little to do with the Cold War. From these efforts, the
International Energy Agency and the G-7 were born.
Brzezinski, with President Carter, worked to build a “framework of international cooperation” for a world that the
Cold War no longer defined and brought human rights into the foreign-policy mainstream. Only as US-Soviet
relations deteriorated in the late 1970s did the Carter administration adopt an invigorated anti-Soviet policy.
Pragmatic adaptation to events, not devotion to strategic coherence, enabled policymakers to lead the United
States through one of the hardest phases in its superpower career, prefiguring the Cold War’s resolution on
American terms.
America today faces complex and discordant challenges. For John McCain, a revanchist Russia, a rising China, a
truculent Iran, an implacable Islamism, and a rash of failing states make the world more dangerous than ever.
McCain might have included (as Scowcroft did) global climate change, an existential challenge for industrial
civilization. It is seductive to presume that a singular strategy could enable the United States to transcend,
resolve, and master the myriad challenges it faces.
The hope is forlorn. Containment during the Cold War provided no roadmap for policy. At most, containment
enjoined acceptance of the world’s division and optimism in the West’s prospects. Within this loose outlook,
policymakers improvised and adapted, pursuing diverse agendas. The most effective, like Kissinger, understood
that even superpowers do not determine the course of world events; instead, their leaders must react and
respond. Presuming the reverse risks the kind of strategic hubris that embroiled the United States in the quagmire
that President Obama has struggled for six years to resolve.
What role then for strategy? Strategic thinking, which weighs costs and benefits and contemplates long-range
consequences, is a prerequisite for responsible foreign policy. Yet Americans should beware the notion that world
affairs can be comprehended within coherent, meta-historical frameworks: the Cold War, globalization, the clash of
civilizations, and so on. To be creative, strategy must acknowledge both the provisionality of its own conclusions
and the validity of alternative perspectives on the world. Like history, it must remain a work in continual progress.
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